Following the conclusion of the 18th Party Congress, a new Politburo Standing Committee, the top leadership body of the Chinese Communist Party, has been named. Much of the recent commentary
has revolved around whether or how China’s new leaders will pursue
much-needed economic and political reforms. An equally important
question concerns the future direction of Chinese foreign policy under
Xi Jinping.
To repeat Zhou Enlai’s assessment of social upheaval in France in 1968, it is “too early to say.” Very little – if anything – from the backgrounds of these individuals can illuminate whether China will adopt a new approach to foreign relations in the coming five or ten years.
An assessment of China’s foreign policy under Xi is “too early” for
several other reasons. Although general secretary of the party, Xi
Jinping will not become head of state, or president, until the National
People’s Congress in March 2013.
In addition, who will hold key positions in China’s foreign policy system (waijiao xitong) remains unknown. The most important vacancy to be filled is the director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office (zhongyang waishi bangongshi). The post is currently held by Dai Bingguo,
who is China’s highest-ranking official in foreign policy after the
party’s general secretary. The CFAO coordinates policy within the
party-state bureaucracy, always a challenge, and provides research and
advice on foreign affairs to China’s top leaders. Other key posts to
watch are the foreign minister, the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office and the head of the CCP’s International Liaison Department.
Finally, Xi and the new Politburo Standing Committee may not launch
new initiatives of their own for perhaps one or two years – once key
positions are filled, working relationships are formed among the new
leaders, and power is consolidated.
In this context, the best clues to Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping may be found in the lengthy work report
that outgoing general secretary Hu Jintao delivered at the opening of
the party congress. Despite being laden with socialist slogans and
Chinese political jargon, the report both sums up what the party
believes has been achieved since the last congress and outlines
principles to guide the party’s work until the next congress.
Consistent with past practice, Xi Jinping as incoming general secretary
oversaw the drafting of this year’s report.
The report has a mixed-message on foreign policy issues. On the one
hand, the report underscores that China will continue to press ahead
with policies that have raised anxiety and concern in East Asia. In the
section on “ecological progress,”
Hu Jintao called for China to become a “maritime power.” In
particular, Hu said that the party “should enhance our capacity for
exploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect the
marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard China's maritime
rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power.” In other
words, expect greater Chinese activity in maritime Asia, including
increased fishing and perhaps hydrocarbon exploration in disputed waters
and a growing presence of the civil maritime law enforcement agencies,
including the China Marine Surveillance force, the Fisheries Law
Enforcement Command and the Maritime Safety Agency.
The section on defense policy
indicated that the comprehensive modernization of China’s armed forces
will continue. In this regard, the report called for developing a
military “commensurate with China's international standing” to address
“interwoven problems affecting its survival and development security as
well as traditional and non-traditional security threats.”
On the other hand, the foreign affairs portion
of the report contained a glimmer of potential “new thinking” that
might feature more prominently in the next few years. In particular,
the report outlined how China will endeavor “to establish a new type of
relations of long-term stability and sound growth with other major
countries.”
The phrase “new type of relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi) echoed language that appeared for the first time in Hu Jintao’s speech at 4th U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
in May 2012 (which was swamped by attention to the Cheng Guangchen
case.) The core of the concept is a recognition of the security dilemma
and the need to avoid conflict typically associated with power
transitions in world politics. Although it remains a work-in-progress,
the inclusion of this new phrase in the work report of the congress
indicates the priority that has been attached to developing it. Given
the clear implications of conflict between the U.S. and China for the
region, this aspect of the report is noteworthy and encouraging.
Finally, the work report underscores the dominance of the most
important factor in China’s foreign policy: domestic politics. Only
about 10 percent of the report addressed externally-related issues (i.e,
defense policy, Taiwan and foreign policy). The remainder emphasized
the economic and social challenges that the party must confront –
roughly matching perhaps the amount of time that China’s top leaders
spend on foreign affairs. In this sense, Chinese foreign policy under
Xi Jinping is likely to remain inherently reactive and not proactive.
M. Taylor Fravel is an
Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security
Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He can be
followed on Twitter @fravel.
Image credit:
Flickr (The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa)
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