By The Staff of FUTURITY.ORG, Futurity.org
November 25, 2012
Looking at large national and international banks in terms of
ecosystem stability and contagion models reveals that their influence
and potential power for destruction far exceeds their actual size.
Like
the impact of an elephant herd grazing on grassland, multinational
banks shape the financial environment to an extent that far outweighs
their small number. And like a contagious person on a transnational
flight, when these giant, interconnected banks succumb to financial
ills, they are uniquely positioned to infect wide swaths of the
financial system. When a large bank — defined as having various holdings
and extensive connections — falters, widespread financial loss
and a virulent drop in confidence can quickly consume a financial
system, the researchers report in the journal Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences. Systems like those in the United States in
which a few banks hold most of the assets amplify these effects.
As a result, the capital that current regulations require large banks
to maintain should not be based solely on its own risk, but also on the
institution’s systemic importance, the researchers suggest. This would
mean that large banks maintain capital that not only surpasses that of
smaller regional and local banks, but also is proportionally larger than
the bank’s slice of the financial pie.
Lead author and Princeton University
mathematical epidemiologist Nimalan Arinaminpathy explains that the
paper represents part of an effort to examine how tumult, such as the
2007-08 global financial crisis, can spread throughout a banking system.
Prior to the crisis, regulators typically judged banks on their
individual health rather than their potential threat to the overall
network, he says.
“In terms of regulation, there was really very
little attention to how the financial system worked as a whole,” says
Arinaminpathy, who is a postdoctoral research associate in Princeton
University’s department of ecology and evolutionary biology. “When
looking only at individual institutions, big is beautiful because larger
banks can more easily diversify their assets. But a system-level
perspective reveals that when a big bank goes down its impact is much
bigger than its size regardless of diversity. We wanted a modeling
framework to explore how big that effect could be and how to lessen its intensity.”
In
addition, says second author Sujit Kapadia, a Bank of England
financial-policy adviser, the models demonstrate how a lack of
confidence perpetuates a financial crisis. That fear manifests as
“liquidity hoarding,” wherein banks stop lending to one another.
Unlike
a virus, financial contagion only spreads more quickly and widely when
banks “quarantine” themselves by freezing loans and cutting business
ties. That, in turn, feeds distress, which further fuels withdrawal from
the system. This power of fear to promote failure was evident following
the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008, which was a
major driver of the global crisis, Kapadia says.
“After Lehman
Brothers failed in 2008, confidence disappeared from the system rather
suddenly and the system just fell off a precipice,” Kapadia says. “The
speed and sharpness of that collapse in confidence was more than might
have been expected before the crisis, and is one of the reasons we tried
to build confidence effects into this framework.”
The researchers’ conclusion that larger banks should maintain capital relevant to their importance
could actually promote innovation in the industry by favoring smaller,
more agile banks, explains George Sugihara, a theoretical biologist at
the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the University of California,
San Diego. Sugihara, a published proponent of similar approaches to
regulating large banks, is familiar with the PNAS paper, but had no role in it.
“This
would basically create a systemic-risk tax for larger more highly
connected institutions and work to the advantage of smaller financial
institutions,” Sugihara says. “It is there in the small banks and
thrifts that many publicly useful financial innovations arise.” The
models the researchers created illustrate that such a policy is not only
crucial, Sugihara says, but also potentially far-reaching and
relatively simple to implement in comparison to existing, more complex
regulations.
THE BIG PICTURE
“This particular integration of network dynamics with confidence effects makes this model unique, and potentially both minimal and comprehensive,” Sugihara says. “It calls attention to a general class of problem that has a long tradition in ecology but is only recently being taken seriously in central banking—namely, the importance of evaluating risk by viewing banking as a ‘whole’ system.”
“This particular integration of network dynamics with confidence effects makes this model unique, and potentially both minimal and comprehensive,” Sugihara says. “It calls attention to a general class of problem that has a long tradition in ecology but is only recently being taken seriously in central banking—namely, the importance of evaluating risk by viewing banking as a ‘whole’ system.”
The researchers simulated a banking system
inspired by models of ecosystems first developed in the 1970s by the
paper’s third author, Robert May, a professor of zoology at Oxford, a
Princeton visiting professor in ecology and evolutionary biology, and
former chief scientific adviser to the UK government.
In ecology,
these frameworks cast a holistic eye on how the interactions between
different species can shape the stability of an ecosystem. In
epidemiology, the consideration is the various avenues through which a
virus is introduced and spread through a population.
Banking
systems now need similar scrutiny, May explains, because regulations
have since the late 1980s typically focused on minimizing risk for
individual banks at the expense of the wider financial world. Large
institutions have been free to expand their activities, May says. At the
same time, those big institutions were permitted before the crisis to
maintain financial reserves proportionately less than those held by
small banks on the reasoning that the sheer size of a larger bank’s
holdings would be more resilient to economic tumult.
“The need to
analyze financial systems—as distinct from the operation of individual
banks, one-by-one—is making itself increasingly obvious,” May says.
“Individual banks have tended to become more diverse in their
activities, but the system as a whole has become less diverse. In short,
there is a tension between what might be best for each individual bank
and what might be best for the system as a whole.”
If the
financial world were an ecosystem, large banks would be like a “keystone
species,” Arinaminpathy says. These species’ importance extends beyond
their biomass, or the collective weight of resident individuals, he
says. For instance, a typical elephant herd can weigh several hundred
tons, but the effect it has on the grasslands on which the animals graze
has a cascading impact on other species that exceeds their physical
presence.
“For large banks, we’re not just looking at their
individual size but the role they play in the financial network as a
whole,” Arinaminpathy says.
When it comes to the spread of
financial disease, large banks can act as a “super spreader,” a sick
individual that can spread a contagion widely, Arinaminpathy says. An
example is the contagious person whose infection spreads easily in the
tight confines of a long flight. Likewise, multinational banks have
numerous close financial ties that speed transmission. But while
isolation can stem a biological virus, financial “contagions” feed on
anxiety.
“An important distinction from biological disease is that
financial contagions become more virulent and transmissible the more
anxious people become,” Arinaminpathy says. “We capture the
well-observed phenomenon that a loss of confidence creates a cycle of
financial and psychological insecurity. The worse confidence gets, the
more severe those financial shocks get.”
OUT OF PROPORTION The researchers’ financial
models contained 200 banks and three “contagion channels” that introduce
illness into the system—liquidity hoarding, the spread of defaults, and
a collapse in asset value (such as mortgages). Though these avenues of
financial crisis have been examined individually, Kapadia says, he and
his co-authors are the first to demonstrate how they interact with one
another and with system-wide confidence.
The central model
contained eight large banks and 192 smaller banks, all with equal
capital and cash. The researchers selected a random bank for sudden
failure and measured how that affected the entire bank system through
each of the three contagion channels. It was in this model that
financial trouble in one bank could create a tide of uncertainty that
caused widespread distress in the system. Yet, catastrophe could be
averted more often if large banks have backup capital commensurate with
their size.
Notably, in these simulations, when a large bank
collapsed the probability of the system collapsing as a result exceeded
16 percent. There was no such risk when a small bank failed. The impact
was highly localized and the probability that more than three additional
banks would falter was less than 2 percent. “The models aren’t set up
to make quantitative estimates, but rather to show that if they fail,
larger banks will have a more-than-proportionate impact on the financial
system than smaller banks,” Kapadia says. “Twice the bank size doesn’t
mean twice the impact from bank failure. Instead, the financial network
acting together with confidence effects can be a strong amplifier, so
that you get more than twice the impact.”
A banking system akin to
that in the United States wherein a few banks control most assets
worsened these effects. The researchers created a more concentrated
model using data from the American financial sector indicating that 1.4
percent of US banks controlled 79 percent of banking system assets in
the first quarter of 2011. In their simulation, three banks out of 200
were large, but each was 250-times the size of a smaller bank. In such a
model system the failure of a single large bank was even more
catastrophic, while the system is virtually unaffected by small banks
until they all fail.
Another scenario factored in diversification
by allowing big banks to hold twice as many types of assets as small
banks. The researchers found that large banks with a variety of holdings
can survive hard times longer, but once they eventually suffer failure,
the implications for the system can be more widespread than in the
other models.
Although diversification is lauded as a stopgap to
crisis, Arinaminpathy says, he and his co-authors found that it also
could heighten vulnerability by increasing the exposure to risk on
numerous fronts. “Diversification does protect a financial institution
somewhat, but once several assets sour, banks now have many avenues for
transmitting and contracting contagions,” he says. “So looking at things
on a systemic level, variety can be a bad thing once a bank fails and
the outcome can be just as destructive, if not more.”
The
researchers plan to build on their work with models that more closely
resemble real banking systems, as well as explore indicators of what
makes a bank systemically important and how risk builds up in a system
over time, Arinaminpathy and Kapadia say. “The essential point of this
paper,” Arinaminpathy says, “is that the financial network works
together with confidence effects to amplify the importance of larger
banks to a scale beyond their size, and that these effects could be key
when thinking about how we might better regulate the system in the
future.”
Grants from the National Institutes of Health and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation supported the research. This article originally appeared in Futurity.org. Source: Princeton University.
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