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Xi Jinping's affable, plainspoken demeanor is the big story of the power transition.
A security guard watches new Communist Party General Secretay Xi Jinping speak on a screen. (Reuters)
The "Great Unveiling" of the new Chinese leadership took place as
expected on November 15, and the post-mortem judgment was virtually
unanimous that the final line-up reflected a "conservative" leadership
stacked with more sexagenarians than what many had hoped. And as such,
hopes of fundamental reforms have been dashed for now (see here, here, and here).
Although the conservative vs. reformer framework always struck me as a
false dichotomy, I will leave the elaboration of that subject for
another time. Instead, I think the conclusion of the party congress
contained three surprises, and left many questions, that are worth
pondering.
Surprise 1: Jiang Zemin's return. Even though "retired" President
Jiang was reportedly terminally ill several years ago, he re-inserted
himself vigorously into the personnel decisions at the 11th hour. The
spritely 86-year-old hardly appeared like someone who had been on his
death bed, charging around the Chinese capital with a mission. Indeed,
at least three of the seven members on the 18th Politburo Standing
Committee turned out to be Jiang's proteges, while outgoing President Hu
Jintao was only able to get one true protege, Li Keqiang, into the
ruling body.
I assume now that the transition is complete, Jiang will again fade into
the shadows, having accomplished what was likely his political swan
song. Jiang's high-profile outing, and his ostensible success in
reprising his role as a powerful patron of top personnel, seem to
reinforce the prevailing view that Hu has been a weak leader. Or at the
very least, he wasn't as capable politically to maneuver around the
institutional interests or Jiang's continued hold on aspects of
political power to achieve his objectives. Some have even interpreted
Hu's reign as merely riding the wave of policy dividends and economic inertia that Deng Xiaoping and then Jiang Zemin had already unleashed.
Surprise 2: The "Hu legacy." Speculation was rife that Hu would
maintain his grip on the Chinese military just as Jiang did after he
formally stepped down. Yet Hu ceded the chairmanship of the Central
Military Commission (CMC) to new President Xi Jinping immediately, a
move that took many by surprise.
One explanation for Hu simultaneously relinquishing his posts at the
party and the military is that he had already stuffed the CMC with
enough allies that he felt less compelled to stay. Yet this would
contradict the "Hu is weak" argument if he had enough clout to influence
PLA personnel decisions. Might Hu's unexpected action be a subtle
revenge move against Jiang? That is, Hu's clean break can be viewed as
an attempt to institutionalize the transition process, in direct
contrast to Jiang's arbitrary interpretation of procedural norms and
conventions by willfully extending his longevity in the seat of power
and repeated interventions in personnel. In fact, as John Garnaut
reports in the Sydney Morning Herald:
The security officials wanted to know about the origins of Ji [Pomin]'s animosity towards Jiang and Ji did not let them down. In Ji's view, Jiang had made China virtually ungovernable by refusing to cede full authority to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002.He told me -- perhaps with some bravado -- he spent three hours lecturing his captors on how Jiang had derailed China's efforts to institutionalise its leadership successions and had paralysed China's political process, while they dutifully took notes.
Even Xi weighed in to commend Hu for his action, portraying
the outgoing chairman's decision as putting the country's interets
first. Hu may have been a weak politician, but he may have made a strong
political statement against his predecessor and salvaged some of his
legacy.
Surprise 3: Xi's likeability. Xi's first outing as the new face
of China was widely applauded as positive. Perhaps it was the baritone
voice or the body language suggesting a man more comfortable in his own
skin, I was struck by the positive reception to Xi both within China and
among foreign observers who watched. To be fair, it didn't take much
for Xi to exceed what were already abysmal expectations from a public
accustomed to Hu's colorlessness for a decade. Xi didn't need soaring
rhetoric to impress -- moving from a robot to a human was sufficiently
distinctive. What's more, Xi's capable command of proper Mandarin,
unlike Hu's Anhui-dialect laced Mandarin, did not escape notice
among Chinese netizens -- many of whom are of the generation in which
standard Mandarin became the social norm. Without even trying, Xi
projected an image, by virtue of his Mandarin skills, of a politician
who is cross-generational.
Yet there seemed to be more than simply the contrast between the new
leader and the one of yesteryear that impressed the Chinese public. Many
noticed that not only did Xi begin his inaugural speech with an apology
for the leadership's tardiness (they were 45 minutes late arriving on
stage), he also specifically thanked journalists for their hard work.
Whether sincere or not, in an environment in which journalists and the
Communist Party do not have the best of relationships -- since the
latter relishes obstructing the work of the former -- Xi's comments was a
kind gesture at the very least. Even more, his speech was not larded
with turgid party-speak
that usually obfuscates more than it clarifies -- the Deng Xiaoping
theory, three represents, and scientific outlook development that Hu was
so fond of never appeared in Xi's address. Chinese weibo users clearly
noticed too. Courtesy of Helen Gao again, here's a particularly popular
insta-assessment from a Chinese writer Yang Hengjun:
杨恒均的微博: 评习总讲话：一，使用了一些不常在这种场合使用的语气词，亲切；二，一上来就说"让大家久等"，并抱歉，三，多次提到带领党与人民、中华民族，国家、共同富裕之路，一次提到"特色"，牛！四，讲话强调了从严治党。五，"人民"出现频率超高，远高于"党"。六，强调中外互相了解，并作为结束语。
(Quick translation: Assessing President Xi's speech:
one, used language and diction uncommon in these occasions, appeared
endearing; two, immediately apologized to everyone for being late;
three, mentioned leading the party and Chinese people, Chinese nation
and state toward the path of co-prosperity, only mentioned "chinese
characteristics" once, badass! four, emphasized strictly dealing with
party discipline and corruption; five, the word "people" appeared many
more times than "party"; six, stressed mutual understanding between
China and the world in conclusion.)
Indeed, segments of his speech even echoed recognizable elements in a
stump speech during a U.S. election, particularly as he ticked off what
Chinese people want: education, stable job, good income, reliable social
security, better health-care services ... and to have a better life for
ourselves and our children. Nowhere was economic growth mentioned.
Another Chinese netizen with the weibo handle "pretending to be in New
York" agreed with Xi's characterization:
假装在纽约：其实大多数人没有太高的奢望，想要的不过是正常的生活----打车时车窗能正常摇开，上网时网站能正常打开，能正常买到菜刀不用实名登记，正常下馆子不用担心地沟油，正常买得起房子，能正常呼吸未被重污染的干净空气......今天听了一个还算正常的发言，于是有了一些正常的期待
(Quick translation: Actually most people don't have
outsized expectations. They simply want a normal life -- a window can be
rolled down normally in a taxi, a webpage can be opened normally, can
buy a normal kitchen knife without being subject to real-name
registration, eating at a normal restaurant without having to worry
about "gutter oil", can buy a house through a normal process, can breath
normal air ... today I heard a basically normal speech, and so there is
some hope for giving normality a shot.)
In fact,
when comparing Xi's speech from that of Hu 10 years ago (right column
below), the annotated version above pointed out differences. Clearly, Xi
had omitted virtually all theoretical jargon that appeared in the third
paragraph of the Hu speech, instead refocusing on people and alluding
to the party's internal problems.
(Story continues below)
Without a doubt, Xi's first public appearance instantaneously boosted
his likeability -- that perennially important trait U.S. presidential
aspirants assiduously develop. It is of course easy to dismiss all of
this as style over substance. But I wouldn't underestimate just how much
Xi's likeability will matter to his domestic constituency in terms of
governance and how the image of China may change under the princeling
president who one could conceivably have a beer with.
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